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12.1 Introduction
For over two decades, governments in various jurisdictions in Canada have
been experimenting with mandatory joint worker-management committees.
For the most part, these committees have been "limited purpose," with worker
representatives mandated to participate on committees with management in an
advisory capacity on a specific issue or topic, such as education and training,
technological change, or plant closure (Adams 1986). In most instances these
committees are confined to organized work sites, although in a limited number
of cases they may be required by all firms of a certain size or in a particular
industry or sector, such as in mining or forestry. By far the most comprehensive
experience in Canada with mandated joint committees is in the area of occupa-
tional health and safety. Today, a majority of Canadian jurisdictions require
firms to establish joint committees with elected worker representatives as ve-
hicles for worker participation in reducing work-related disease and injury and
improving the workplace environment. While these mandated joint health and
safety committees (JHSCs) are a far cry from European-type comprehensive
works councils, they nevertheless constitute a significant development in North
American industrial relations by taking the giant step of legislating worker
participation outside of and beyond the framework of traditional collective bar-
gaining.
In this paper, a North American contribution to a comparative study on
works councils, we will examine the evolution of mandated occupational
health and safety joint committees with respect to the following questions:
How were JHSCs introduced into a North American adversarial industrial
relations system?
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How do they perform?
To what extent do mandatory committees substitute for trade unions and/or
government enforcement of regulations?
What is the role of government in assisting and promoting such a system of
internal responsibility?
In particular, we will concentrate on the evolution and function of JHSCs
in Ontario. While there are common features to the enabling legislation and
regulations in most Canadian jurisdictions, Ontario, as Canada's industrial
heartland and the most populous province, has had the most instructive and
far-reaching experience with JHSCs. Ontario was one of the first jurisdictions
to promote joint committees, at first voluntarily, then as mandated since 1978.
Today it has the most extensive legislation, which not only requires committees
in most workplaces but also mandates worker representatives in work sites
with too few employees for a full committee. Ontario has evolved toward an
"internal responsibility system" in occupational safety and health. This system
seeks to empower both workplace parties through joint committees that take
mutual responsibility for reducing hazards and injuries in the workplace. With
the most recent amendments to the province's health and safety legislation,
Ontario moved beyond the level of the firm and has created a bipartite author-
ity, the Workplace Health and Safety Agency (WHSA), with the power to es-
tablish and administer a unique certification process with mandatory training
for members of health and safety committees. It has also proposed a yet-to-be-
developed accreditation system for employers who operate successful health
and safety programs and policies. Ontario's creation of the WHSA represents
an attempt to extend the bipartite approach beyond the enterprise level and to
promote a cooperative approach to the work environment at the sectoral and
provincial levels. In this paper, we will begin with an overview of the evolution
of the legal and institutional framework for mandated joint committees
throughout Canada. We will then look at the specific case of Ontario and the
development of sectoral and provincewide bipartite support entities. We will
examine joint committees' relationships with employers, unions, and workers
and, in the case of Ontario, with the WHSA. Finally, we will examine the role
of government in nurturing bipartite committees and forums at the sectoral and
provincial levels as well as at the level of the firm.
12.2 Legal Environment
While there are important differences, Canadian labor law is in many ways
similar to the Wagner Act in the United States. That is, the law proceeds from
an assumption that the "natural state" of a new enterprise is nonunionized. In
order for workers to organize a union and receive the designation of exclusive
bargaining agent, they must surmount legal barriers constructed to prove that
the employees freely chose to form or join a union. It is generally conceded353 Canada: Joint Committees on Occupational Health and Safety
that the organizing and certification process is somewhat easier in Canada than
in the United States in that the whole process is much faster and there are
stronger legal sanctions against employer interference in the process. But in
marked contrast to Western Europe, the general North American industrial re-
lations framework assumes that workers have little or no right outside of col-
lective bargaining to participation in decision making in the workplace.
Although the framework of Canadian labor legislation was originally mod-
eled after the U.S. National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), there are some im-
portant differences that affect the policies discussed in this paper. Most sig-
nificant, Canadian governments at all levels have tended to be more
interventionist in their approach to industrial relations. From the Industrial
Disputes Investigation Act of 1907 to today, governments in Canadian jurisdic-
tions have assumed a more active role in mediation and conciliation of dis-
putes. Also, Canadian governments have sought to promote labor and manage-
ment cooperation through funding of training and education and through the
establishment of joint labor and management research and education centers
such as the Canadian Labour Market and Productivity Centre.
In contrast to the U.S. NLRA, Canada has no single labor code for the entire
country. In all, there are 13 different jurisdictions in Canada—ten provinces,
two territories, and a federal jurisdiction. The federal jurisdiction accounts for
only 10 percent of the workforce (Meltz 1989) covering federal government
employees, workers in banks, communications, and interprovincial and inter-
national transportation. Most workers fall under their respective provincial or
territorial jurisdiction, with each province or territory legislating labor stan-
dards, industrial relations, and occupational health and safety standards within
its own territory. While there is great potential for interprovincial variation in
legislation, for the most part unions have been successful in extending support-
ive labor legislation from province to province. In recent years, with the elec-
tion of labor-supported social democratic governments in Ontario, parts of
Western Canada, and Quebec, provincial labor legislation has played a leading
role in extending rights for workers and in improving standards and proce-
dures.
Until the 1970s, work environment standards in most jurisdictions were a
patchwork of divergent statutes and administrations. Some work sites were
covered by a variety of conflicting and competing statutes, while others were
left without any legislative health and safety protection at all. In Ontario, for
example, there were different statutes administered by separate ministries for
mining, construction, industrial, and logging enterprises (Dematteo 1991). In
all Canadian jurisdictions, the previous norm was state standard setting and
enforcement. Worker participation was limited to unionized workers lobbying
government agencies on standards and contract negotiations where unions
could bargain the "terms and conditions" of employment (Tucker 1990,
20-21).
Since the 1970s, however, there have been substantial changes in the public354 Elaine Bernard
policy approach to the work environment. These changes can be attributed to
an overall increased "awareness of and concern about the relationship between
the general environment and human health," an interest in lowering health care
costs associated with work-related illness and injury, and increased labor mobi-
lization creating pressure for a greater voice for labor in workplace decision
making (Tucker 1990).
Saskatchewan in 1972 passed the first omnibus occupational health and
safety statute, creating the model for other Canadian jurisdictions. The Sas-
katchewan legislation established in North America for the first time the work-
ers right to know about hazardous materials, the right to refuse dangerous
work, and the right to participate in decision making concerning the work
environment through mandatory worker-management health and safety com-
mittees (Bryce and Manga 1985, 272).
In spite of its small population (about one million, constituting one twenty-
fifth of the Canadian population), Saskatchewan has often been in the forefront
of introducing innovative legislation of national significance. The birthplace
of the socialist farm-labor party in Canada, the Cooperative Commonwealth
Federation (which later with the Canadian Labour Congress cofounded the
New Democratic party [NDP]), Saskatchewan was the first jurisdiction in
North America to grant collective bargaining rights to public employees. In
1961 the Saskatchewan NDP government developed a universal, comprehen-
sive health insurance system that became the model for Canada's national
health care system introduced less than a decade later.
Losing power to the Liberals between 1964 and 1971, the NDP was returned
to power in Saskatchewan in 1971 with strong support from the labor move-
ment. Building on the success of their earlier health care plan, the new Sas-
katchewan government's initiatives in the area of occupational health and
safety complemented both the proworker stance of the NDP government and
its concern for health promotion through preventive care.
The 1972 legislation consolidated occupational health and safety activities
into the province's Department of Labour, Occupational Health and Safety
(OHS) Branch. Joint worker-management committees were made mandatory
for most workplaces with 10 or more employees. Within a few years, the OHS
Branch was able to report that there were over 2,500 joint committees through-
out the province, providing coverage for 80 percent of Saskatchewan's nonagri-
cultural workforce (Sass 1990, 3).
Throughout the late 1970s and 1980s most provincial jurisdictions and the
federal government moved to consolidate the various pieces of work environ-
ment legislation into "omnibus" statutes. These were administered by a single
government department or commission with the power to administer and write
regulation in its jurisdiction. While not originally conceived of as deregulation,
the move toward an "internal responsibility" regime in the workplace can be
seen as both a method of simplifying, consolidating, and streamlining complex
regulation as well as a means for shifting the burden of authority and responsi-
bility for improving the work environment onto the parties in the workplace.355 Canada: Joint Committees on Occupational Health and Safety
Concurrent with this legislative consolidation, workers in most jurisdictions
won statutory guarantees of what have come to be known as the three basic
rights in the area of occupational health and safety: the right to know about
hazards in the work environment, the right to refuse unsafe work, and the right
to participate in the detection, evaluation, and reduction of workplace hazards
(Sass 1990).
The scope of the new health and safety legislation was similar to labor stan-
dards legislation, in that it extended rights to workers whether or not they were
unionized. But rather like blanket labor standards, certain groupings of em-
ployees were exempted from the health and safety legislation either by the
limited number of employees at their work site or by the type of work they
were involved in. In most jurisdictions, for example, police, prison guards,
firefighters, and retail, agricultural, and construction workers were excluded.
While there is some variation in the specific wording and procedures for
exercising these rights, all jurisdictions today have guaranteed in some way the
right to refuse dangerous work and the right to know about workplace hazards.
The federal and provincial governments' adoption of the Workplace Hazardous
Materials Information System (WHMIS), which stipulates requirements for
labels on hazardous materials and mandates the availability of uniform mate-
rial safety sheets and training of employees using hazardous materials, has
assured at least a baseline of "the right to know" in all jurisdictions.
In all but four jurisdictions the establishment of committees is required as
the normative structure for ensuring workers' "right to participation" (see table
12.1). With the exception of Quebec, in the nine jurisdictions where commit-
tees are mandated no worker or union action is required to form a committee
and the legislation generally requires the employer to assure that a joint corn-




































































bOn union initiative or by request of 10 percent of workers.356 Elaine Bernard
mittee is functioning. In Quebec, the following preconditions are sufficient to
require management to assure the formation of a joint committee: a demand
by the local union, or a request by 10 percent of the employees in an unorga-
nized work site; or a request by at least four workers at a work site of fewer
than 40 workers (Quebec National Assembly 1979, section 69). Even in the
four jurisdictions where committees are "discretionary," committees may be
required by either the minister of labor or a designated government official.
The specific responsibilities, functions, and requirements for committees
vary tremendously from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. However, there are a num-
ber of features common to most jurisdictions. Generally, the firm-size thresh-
old for requiring the formation of a committee is 20 or more employees (Sas-
katchewan, with the lowest threshold, requires only 10 or more employees). In
a few jurisdictions, such as Ontario, provision is made in smaller work sites
(of over five employees but fewer than 20) for the election of a single worker
representative with powers similar to that of a joint committee (Ontario Legis-
lature 1990, section 8-1).
There is no general rule for defining what constitutes a "workplace" for the
purposes of forming a joint committee. As an Ontario study reports, "a work-
place defined as a single workplace for ministry inspection purposes" could be
divided by a JHSC into several subareas. Similarly, a single JHSC might serve
in what the ministry may define as several "workplaces" (Ontario Advisory
Council 1986, 17). In Ontario, where negotiated joint committee structures
sometimes preceded the legislation in some industries such as steel and min-
ing, the regulations are purposely silent in order to permit existing negotiated
arrangements and to maximize flexibility for committees. Whether by design
or oversight, the legislation in most jurisdictions is similarly silent on the issue.
The construction industry presents one of the most difficult workplace orga-
nizational problems for joint committees. The temporary transitory nature of
the work site, the diversity of trades active on a work site, and the potential for
large numbers of contractors and subcontractors coming and going throughout
the life of the project make it especially difficult to transfer the general JHSC
model into this industry. In many jurisdictions, this problem is avoided by sim-
ply exempting construction from the general legislation and by writing special
codes and regulations for the industry. In Ontario and Quebec, however, both
jurisdictions have included construction in their provisions and have provided
for joint committees on large construction sites.
In Quebec, a "job-site" committee is required on work sites "where it is
foreseen that activities on a construction site will occupy at least twenty-five
construction workers simultaneously at a particular stage of the work" (Quebec
National Assembly 1979, section 204). The job-site committee includes repre-
sentatives from the principal contractor, each employer, one representative of
the person in charge of the plans and specifications, and one representative
from each of the unions with members on site. This committee is to meet at
least once every two weeks, during regular working hours (Quebec National357 Canada: Joint Committees on Occupational Health and Safety
Assembly 1979, sections 205 and 207). In Ontario, a nonmandated "trades
committee" is formed from all the represented trades on a job site, and this
committee forwards problems and suggestions to the mandated joint com-
mittee.
All mandated JHSCs function as bipartite bodies requiring equal numbers
of worker and management members on the committee—with a sharing of
chairing duties or some other provision for joint leadership of the committee.
Some jurisdictions have a formula for committee size according to the total
number of employees in an enterprise, others are silent on maximum or mini-
mum committee size. Most jurisdictions prohibit employer representatives
from outnumbering the worker representatives.
As is often the rule in Canada, Quebec is a special case, adding an additional
element to the general trend of bipartite committees. Taking advantage of the
province's unique system of health care and social service delivery, joint occu-
pational health and safety committees in Quebec have the right to choose a
physician approved by a designated hospital center or department of commu-
nity health to prepare and monitor a work site "health plan" and to be "in
charge of health services in the establishment." While the joint committee hires
the physician, management is responsible for the costs both of the physician
and of implementing the health program (Quebec National Assembly 1979,
section 78). The designated physician is a member of the joint committee but
does not have a vote in meetings. Quebec is the only jurisdiction in which
committees regularly include physicians or other outside experts.
In all jurisdictions, management is expected to select its own committee
members. In some legislation, such as in the Ontario act, the law seeks to as-
sure that management representatives be persons who exercise "managerial
functions" and "to the extent possible" are employed at the workplace (Ontario
Legislature 1990, section 9-9). In unionized work sites, the local union is nor-
mally empowered in the legislation to determine the method for selecting the
worker representatives. In some instances, where more than one union repre-
sents the workers, the unions are "encouraged" to work together to ensure that
the interests of all the employees are represented by the work representatives
on the committee.
In nonunionized work sites, employees select their own representatives—
although in most legislation the exact method of selection is not detailed. In
Ontario, for example, the employer has the responsibility at the nonunionized
work site to "cause a joint committee to be established" and to assure that
"members of the committee who represent workers shall be selected by the
workers they are to represent" (Ontario Legislature 1990, section 9-4). In Que-
bec, the legislation simply states that "the workers' representatives on a com-
mittee shall be designated from among the workers of the establishment"
(Quebec National Assembly 1979, section 72). The legislation normally stipu-
lates the minimum number of meetings for committees, which varies from four
times a year to once a month depending on the jurisdiction. Legislation in most358 Elaine Bernard
jurisdictions also spells out the general terms, functions, responsibilities, and
rights of committee members. Worker committee members, for example, have
the right to participate in such areas as regular workplace inspections for haz-
ards, accident and incident investigation, and communications and recommen-
dations to management. They also have the right to be present during an in-
spection or investigation by a provincial health and safety inspector and to
engage in other committee-related work and responsibilities during regular
working hours with no loss or reduction in pay. In Quebec, the legislation gives
committees the right to select the individual protective devices and equipment
"best adapted to the needs of the workers in their establishment," which man-
agement is required to purchase for their employees (Quebec National Assem-
bly 1979, section 78).
Most legislation includes language to assure that workers in general, and
committee members specifically, are not disciplined, threatened, or subject to
reprisals by employers either for exercising their right to refuse or for per-
forming work related to their joint committee responsibilities (Ontario Legisla-
ture 1990, section 50). The Ontario legislation also includes an "immunity"
clause, prohibiting lawsuits for neglect or default arising from "good faith"
actions of committee members (Ontario Legislature 1990, section 65).
The joint committees are usually required to keep and in some cases post
minutes of all committee meetings. Beyond very rudimentary instructions
about number of meetings, minutes, and size of the committee, most legisla-
tion does not detail how committee meetings are to proceed—for example,
whether by consensus or by vote. Usually these decisions are left to the com-
mittees themselves.
Most legislation is silent on what happens if a committee becomes dead-
locked. The exception to this is Quebec, where provisions in the legislation
give specific procedures for problem resolution when a committee fails to
reach an agreement. The legislation permits either party to appeal to the pro-
vincial oversight agency, the Commission, for a binding resolution after both
parties have submitted their case in writing (Quebec National Assembly 1979,
section 79). The Quebec legislation also assures balanced representation at
committee meetings by stating that "workers' representatives as a whole and
the employer's representatives as a whole are entitled to only one vote, respec-
tively, on a committee" (Quebec National Assembly 1979, section 73).
In most jurisdictions, the function of the committee is primarily advisory
and the legislation (except in Quebec) is vague on what is to happen with a
committee recommendation, or what procedure is to be followed in case of a
conflict on the committee. The B.C. legislation, for example, states that the
committee "shall assist in creating a safe place of work, shall recommend ac-
tions which will improve the effectiveness of the industrial health and safety
program, and shall promote compliance with these regulations" (Workers'
Compensation Board [WCB] of British Columbia 1980, 4.06). In response to
criticisms over committee deadlock, recent amendments to the Ontario legisla-359 Canada: Joint Committees on Occupational Health and Safety
tion give a timeline of 21 days for management to respond in writing to a
committee recommendation (Ontario Legislature 1990, section 8-12).
In most jurisdictions there appears to be little ongoing monitoring of enter-
prises to assess whether committees have been established and whether they
are functioning as mandated. In British Columbia, for example, while the regu-
lations require employers to forward committee minutes to the WCB, a recent
administrative inventory reports that "in practice this is seldom done" (Rest
and Ashford 1992). While all jurisdictions have the power to levy fines and
other penalties for noncompliance, this is an extremely rare occurrence.
The absence of detailed monitoring has led many observers to speculate
on the degree to which there is compliance in forming and maintaining joint
committees. An important exception to this lack of empirical data is an exten-
sive survey of joint committees commissioned by the Ontario Advisory Coun-
cil on Occupational Health and Occupational Safety, a tripartite body set up to
advise the minister of labor in Ontario on occupational health and safety mat-
ters. This 1986 study, designed to measure the effectiveness of the Ontario
internal responsibility system after its first five years of operations, surveyed
both worker and management JHSC members in a random sample of over
3,000 Ontario workplaces (Ontario Advisory Council 1986, 178). It concluded
that JHSCs were established in 93 percent of the workplaces where required,
including 88.4 percent of the nonunionized workplaces and 96 percent of the
unionized workplaces (Ontario Advisory Council 1986, 35).
Aside from simply assuring that committees are organized, compliance in
most jurisdictions also requires that the committees carry out the many func-
tions specified in the legislation. In this area, the Ontario study reported rather
elliptically that "most firms comply fully with most features of the act, but
few are in full compliance" (Ontario Advisory Council 1986, 107). Overall, it
concluded that "compliance with specific provisions of the act is poor among
workplaces with JHSCs: only some 22% of workplaces with JHSCs appear to
be in full compliance with the act" (Ontario Advisory Council 1986, v).
There is wide variation throughout Canada in the role of government in sup-
porting and promoting committees, and in monitoring and enforcing compli-
ance. Aside from differences between jurisdictions, even within a given juris-
diction, such as in the case of Saskatchewan, changes in government or policy
can lead to increased or decreased interest in compliance. During the first 10
years of the new health and safety legislation in Saskatchewan, the OHS
Branch played a very active role in promoting and monitoring the work of joint
committees. With a change in government in the early 1980s, however, the
branch ceased to play as active a role in assuring that committees functioned
(Parsons 1989).
In the two largest jurisdictions in Canada, Quebec and Ontario, governments
have sought to augment and extend the enterprise-based "internal responsibil-
ity system" through the creation of bipartite administrative bodies responsible
for overseeing occupational health and safety and implementing joint business-360 Elaine Bernard
labor training and decision making at the provincewide level. The Commission
de la Sante et de la Securite du Travail (CSST) in Quebec and the WHSA in
Ontario have essentially similar functions in their respective provinces, includ-
ing the right to develop, direct, and fund research, to raise general public
awareness of the issue, and to conduct training and education in occupational
health and safety (Quebec National Assembly 1979, section 167; Ontario Leg-
islature 1990, section 13).
The creation of the WHSA in Ontario is part of an ambitious program to
strengthen the "internal responsibility system." In keeping with the recommen-
dations of the 1986 study of joint committees in Ontario, the WHSA was given
an extensive mandate to improve training and support for the estimated 50,000
joint committees in Ontario and to encourage the bipartite approach to health
and safety throughout the province. The WHSA was also given the special
responsibility to establish and administer a mandatory certification process for
committee members throughout the province and to develop an accreditation
program for employers. Ontario is the first province to take this further step
into mandatory training for committee representatives.
12.3 Training, Certification, and the Evolution of the Internal
Responsibility System in Ontario
The Ontario Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) Act of 1978 remained
substantially unchanged until the summer of 1990, when the provincial Liberal
government under pressure from the labor movement and the NDP opposition
introduced Bill 208, an extensive package of amendments to the act. These
hotly debated reforms expanded the requirement for joint committees to most
work sites in the province with over 20 employees, creating an estimated
30,000 new committees, and required committees in all work sites where des-
ignated substances were being used. In addition, the reforms extended the right
to refuse to workers previously excluded, such as provincial government em-
ployees, police, firefighters, and correctional workers.
Most significant, Bill 208 established the 20-2 member bipartite WHSA, to
be chaired by a nonvoting government appointee and to have equal employer
and labor cochairs and board members. The WHSA was given a provincewide
role in promoting the bipartite approach in health and safety, and its creation
constituted an important new vehicle for facilitating worker/employer jointness
beyond the enterprise-based JHSCs.
As its first major task, the WHSA was given the power to develop the man-
dated "certification" program for committee members. Originally, the certifi-
cation requirement was linked to proposed special powers for JHSC members
to be able to "shut down" a job site. While the 1978 OHS Act had recognized
an individual worker's right to refuse dangerous work, the early drafts of Bill
208 proposed empowering certified worker representatives on a JHSC with the
additional right to unilaterally stop work where there was a violation of the act361 Canada: Joint Committees on Occupational Health and Safety
and where any delay in controlling the hazard might seriously endanger a
worker. Under considerable pressure from the business community, which was
concerned about the unilateral right to stop work, this provision was dropped
from the final version of the bill. As a result, the labor movement and the prola-
bor NDP opposed the bill in the legislature.
While unilateral work stoppage was limited in the legislation, it was not
entirely ruled out. Certified members can gain this authority either through an
employer giving the authority (and depositing a letter to this effect with the
JHSC) or through an adjudicator extending this right in cases where the adjudi-
cator finds that the bilateral stop-work procedure is not sufficient to protect
workers.
In place of the proposed unilateral work stoppage, a bilateral procedure was
substituted requiring both the management and worker certified representa-
tives to agree in order to stop work. In cases of a disagreement, work was to
proceed (though individual workers retained their right to refuse dangerous
work) and an inspector was to be called.
Although the majority Liberal government was able to pass Bill 208, in the
election that followed the Liberal government was defeated and replaced by a
majority NDP provincial government. The new NDP government committed
itself to labor law reform but decided not to make revisions to the recently
amended OHS Act. Rather, the NDP decided to support the creation of the new
bipartite body, the WHSA, and encourage its educational and administrative
role in promoting bipartism and internal responsibility in health and safety.
Although it did not provide labor with the breakthrough that it had hoped
for—the unilateral right to stop work—in general the Bill 208 amendments
did strengthen the power of joint committees and the "internal responsibility
system" in the workplace. Many of the specific changes flowed from the rec-
ommendations of the 1986 Ontario Advisory Council's study, which found that
while workers' rights and resources had been greatly expanded by the 1978
act, their ability to make a full contribution was still limited by lack of informa-
tion, lack of training, and lack of resources. The study concluded "that unless
fully developed through careful legislation and implementation, through train-
ing and education, and unless fully integrated with the workplace, the JHSC
leads not to self-regulation, but rather self-deception" (Ontario Advisory
Council 1986,2:169-70).
With the adoption of Bill 208 and the creation of the WHSA in 1991, the
controversy moved from the work stoppage question to the mandatory training
requirements for certified representatives. The new provision in the act creating
certified representatives required that employers pay for training, instruction
materials, and salaries of at least one worker and management member on their
respective JHSCs. The specifics of the training and the curriculum were to be
worked out by the bipartite WHSA. Specifically, the WHSA needed to resolve
who would be trained and who would deliver the course. It also needed to draft
a curriculum, set the length of training, and decide on a method for evaluating362 Elaine Bernard
competence upon completion. Through consensus, the WHSA was able to re-
solve almost all of these questions. There was consensus that at least one
worker and one employer representative from every committee in the province
was to be certified. A 300-page Core Certificate Training Program Participant's
Manual was drafted. And the province's existing 12 health and safety delivery
organizations were to be made bipartite and designated as authorized trainers
for the certification curriculum.
The program became stalled on the issue of the length of training. Employer
representatives on the WHSA board felt that one week of training would be
adequate, whereas the labor members were adamant that no less than three
weeks would suffice. Eventually, with no consensus in sight, a majority voted
for a compromise, with three levels of core training (depending on the type of
industry): category I would be one week of training plus two days at the work-
place, where candidates would jointly draw up a hazards analysis and health
and safety work plan; category II would be two weeks of training plus two days
in the workplace on the analysis and work plan; and category III would be
three weeks of training plus three days in the workplace devoted to the analysis
and work plan. This majority decision, viewed by some employer representa-
tives as a breach of the commitment to consensus, provoked the resignation of
five of the nine employer board members, who claimed that the compromise
was being forced on the employer community by the NDP provincial gov-
ernment.
Complicating the discussions and contributing to the consensus breakdown
on the WHSA board was the business community's heated campaign against
the NDP provincial government's extensive labor law reform bill that was
passed by the legislature in the fall of 1992. With the WHSA less than two
years old, there was some fear that the employer resignations would lead to the
demise of the bipartite experiment. With four employer representatives re-
maining on the board, new board members were recruited and a provincewide
certification program was launched in April 1993 with the objective of training
the estimated 100,000 committee members requiring certification.
A second major problem for the WHSA was the resistance of the delivery
organizations to adopting bipartite boards. At the time of the creation of the
WHSA, the WCB funded 12 different organizations charged with the delivery
of occupational health and safety programs. They were: eight sectoral safety
associations, which were traditional management safety associations oriented
to specific sectors; the Workers Health and Safety Centre, which was founded
by the Ontario Federation of Labour (OFL) in the early 1980s to provide
worker-oriented programs; and three programs developed to cover the public
sectors (divided into the municipal sector, the educational sector, and the tour-
ism and hospitality sector). The new legislation placed these organizations un-
der the "authority" of the WHSA and gave it the power to withhold their
grants—amounting to $50 million in 1991—if it judged the organizations not
to "have an equal number of representatives of management and of workers."363 Canada: Joint Committees on Occupational Health and Safety
Commissioning a report on the delivery organizations, the WHSA was ad-
vised that in the short term these organizations could not be supplanted or
replaced (SPR Associations, Inc. 1991, 14). With the delivery organizations
already offering over 500 programs throughout the province, and with their
expertise and links to their respective workplaces and industries, the ambitious
certification campaign required the cooperation of the experienced delivery
groups.
While a level of cooperation was developed between the employer-oriented
safety associations and the union-oriented Workers Health and Safety Centre,
there was strong resistance to integrating their boards. A compromise was
eventually found with the creation of a new bipartite oversight board—the
Council of Ontario Health and Safety Sectoral Organizations. The creation of
this special council permitted the worker-oriented Workers Health and Safety
Centre and the employer-oriented sectoral safety associations to maintain their
unitary boards while at the same time meeting the legislated requirement of
jointness.
12.4 Relations with Employers
The resistance by the sectoral safety councils to opening their boards to
joint participation by worker representatives reflects the fact that there are still
profound differences in philosophy and approach between employers and or-
ganized labor on occupational health and safety (SPR Associates, Inc. 1991,
7). Simply put, the traditional employer view of the work environment is that
it is a "safety management" problem that along with productivity and quality
is a responsibility of management (Industrial Accident Prevention Association
[IAPA] 1991, 17). The sectoral safety organizations tended to reflect this "loss
control" approach, which assumed that employers would be motivated to pre-
vent accidents if they were held financially responsible for them (OFL 1991,
6). Until the 1970s, regulation throughout Canada also shared the assumption
that safety and health were primarily a management responsibility. The sec-
toral employer safety organizations were established in most Canadian juris-
dictions concurrently with workers' compensation legislation—1914 in On-
tario, 1917 in British Columbia and Manitoba, 1918 in Alberta, and 1919 in
New Brunswick. These organizations, funded by grants from provincial work-
ers' compensation assessments, were staffed by safety professionals and man-
agers, as well as hundreds of volunteers from member organizations. They
provided expertise, education, and training on health and safety for businesses.
If firms were to be fined and assessed according to their safety records, then
management needed to retain control over the workplace and train its managers
to reduce hazards and accidents. As management was responsible for work-
place safety, it needed the right to organize and design the workplace to meet
this responsibility. In this context, the development of the internal responsibil-
ity system premised on workers and managers having "equal power to act on364 Elaine Bernard
health and safety manners" was viewed as a major intrusion into the area of
management rights (WHSA 1992b, 11).
Historically, the concept of labor and management as "equal partners" in the
workplace was associated almost exclusively with unionization and collective
bargaining. Legislated joint committees introduced this concept—at least in
health and safety—to workplaces that had rejected or successfully avoided
unionization. The most vociferous opposition to the legislation came from non-
unionized and smaller firms. Both the quantitative data from the 1986 Ontario
Advisory Council's study, which shows that firms with fewer workers were
less likely to have a joint committee, and the recent battles in Ontario over
certification, which focused on the hardship of lengthy and expensive training
programs to small firms with few employees, tend to confirm this trend. Fears
by some small business owners that mandated participation in decision making
might lead to unionization do not appear to have been realized, however. Nei-
ther the labor movement nor the business community have linked JHSCs to
union growth or avoidance.
In spite of its initial resistance to joint committees and the subsequent
strengthening of the internal responsibility system, management has learned to
work with the new regulation. And in the case of Ontario, the large sectoral
safety organizations have played an important role in facilitating acceptance
among employers. The great majority of the funding for health and safety train-
ing has continued to be allocated to the employer-oriented safety associations.
Funding for 1991, for example, was allocated as follows: $41.7 million to the
eight sectoral safety committees, $6.9 million to the Workers Health and
Safety Centre, and $1.8 million to the three public sector programs (WHSA
1992a, 25). By retaining and, indeed, even increasing the role of the safety
associations and the funds allocated to them, the Ontario government has
avoided a major confrontation with these organizations. Yet, it has tied them
to its bipartite approach in the long term, both by demanding the restructuring
and integration of their boards and by involving them in the bipartite certifica-
tion and accreditation programs.
With the certification program only recently launched, it is still too early to
assess the degree to which the WHSA and the new legislation will be success-
ful in transforming the safety delivery organizations into genuine bipartite enti-
ties. However, the experience from the earlier reforms, when committees were
first mandated at the level of the firm, shows that management soon learns to
work with the new regime and, in many cases, even view it as a positive
change.
After only five years' experience with mandated joint committees in On-
tario, for example, the 1986 Ontario Advisory Council's study found that man-
agement members on JHSCs were quite positive in their assessment of com-
mittee relationships and functioning. Allaying management fears that
mandated participation and jointness would introduce confrontation and con-
flict into work sites, the assessment of management committee members has365 Canada: Joint Committees on Occupational Health and Safety
been overwhelmingly positive. Management committee members described
committee relationships as being cooperative (89.4 percent), with good mutual
respect (90.2 percent), trusting (89.4 percent), and overall friendly (90.8 per-
cent) (Ontario Advisory Council 1986, 70).
On the crucial measure of the effectiveness of committees in reducing haz-
ards and improving safety, management respondents to the 1986 Ontario study
were overwhelmingly positive. On the overall record of improving safety and
reducing accidents, 56.2 percent judged their committees to be "more than
adequate to excellent." Only 9.2 percent saw the committee's role as "poor to
less than adequate" (Ontario Advisory Council 1986, 97).
Experience with joint committees appears to have convinced many employ-
ers that these committees can play a useful role in reducing accidents and im-
proving safety—and that management does not lose control of the workplace.
The Ontario survey, for example, noted that 66.9 percent of managers and 60.3
percent of workers generally agreed that their committee had achieved the
stated goal of "equal" influence by both parties. Nevertheless, it also concluded
that managers tended to have more influence on committees than workers.
Management ultimately retained the power to implement JHSC recommenda-
tions. While management was required to discuss decisions with the joint com-
mittees, it also had wide discretion over what decisions it felt were appropriate
for committee discussion. The study also noted that management representa-
tives on joint committees had closer links to ministry inspectors and the en-
forcement agencies. Finally, it was noted that management representatives
were, for the most part, better trained and more knowledgeable on health and
safety issues and legislation than most worker representatives (Ontario Advi-
sory Council 1986, 69-81). In Ontario, a further positive feature of the internal
responsibility system for employers has been its evolution toward self-
regulation. While not originally conceived as "deregulatory," the growing em-
phasis on empowering the workplace parties has been seen as a method of
reducing the need for government intervention through monitoring and in-
spection.
12.5 Relations with Unions
Unions have been generally supportive of mandatory JHSCs. The mandating
legislation is viewed as enhancing and complementing rights gained by a mi-
nority of unions through collective bargaining and extending those rights to all
workers through legislation. In most instances, the legislation is viewed as ei-
ther labor inspired or minimally supportive of organized labor. However, in
spite of union support for bipartite committees, unions in Canada view cooper-
ation with management in occupational health and safety with some ambiva-
lence. In particular, unions reject the notion that health and safety is a "neutral"
technical issue. Rather, they see it as an economic and political one—with
labor seeking to continually improve safety standards and levels which are366 Elaine Bernard
socially determined and politically mediated. Because of what labor sees as
the "political" nature of health and safety, Canadian unions have jealously
guarded their role in the education of their members not simply against
management-oriented programs delivered by the sectoral safety associations,
but in opposition to many university- and college-based programs (Procenko
1991; Bernard 1991).
Labor fears that occupational health and safety training will focus on the
seemingly "neutral" technical issues and not give sufficient attention to the
wider economic and political ones. As Bob Sass explains:
In all "technical" questions pertaining to workplace health and safety is the
"social." This refers to the power relations in production—who tells whom
to do what and how fast! After all, the machine does not go faster by itself;
someone designed the machinery, organized the work, designed the job. . . .
The widespread view or notion that both labour and management have equal
concerns regarding occupational health and safety because we are dealing
with pain and suffering is one of the major myths in industrial relations. The
betterment of working conditions costs money and management members
on the committee are forever aware of this fact as legal agents of the share-
holders who are primarily concerned with optimalizing their return on capi-
tal investment. (Sass 1990)
Many of these concerns over the politics of health and safety are at the root
of the tensions and maneuvering around the "certification" process in Ontario
and especially labor's (as well as management's) resistance to attempts by the
newly formed WHSA to force the delivery organizations to adopt bipartite
boards. Because Ontario is attempting to develop bipartite and cooperative
structures throughout the province and especially beyond the level of the firm,
its experience is helpful in shedding light on labor's seemingly ambivalent atti-
tude to bipartism.
At the level of the workplace, health and safety bipartitism has been ac-
cepted by labor because it has increased labor's influence, in that the work
environment is no longer viewed by government as exclusively management's
concern. Mandated joint committees have given added strength to labor's par-
ticipation in creating a safer and healthier work environment. A key provision
in the legislation retained the unions' power to select the worker representa-
tives in organized work sites. This assured that unions would view the joint
committees as a complement to their role in the workplace, not as a threat.
Organized labor also came to see the creation of the WHSA as a factor
increasing its influence—this time by giving it greater voice in decision mak-
ing at the level of the provincial authority. As noted earlier, labor at first op-
posed the reforms that created the WHSA and was even somewhat concerned
about its bipartite training role. After lengthy debate and discussion within the
OFL, however, labor agreed to participate in the WHSA, announcing that "it
was better for labour to participate in order to ensure the highest quality of367 Canada: Joint Committees on Occupational Health and Safety
training materials and delivery systems for all workers in Ontario" (OFL
1991,3).
The WHSA has considerably more power and financial resources than the
old Ontario Advisory Council, which was essentially an advisory board with a
very narrow mandate. Labor also has significantly more power in the WHSA,
a bipartite organization, than it did on the Advisory Council—a tripartite
board. Labor in Canada has long preferred bipartite to tripartite boards, arguing
that because government is itself a large employer, tripartism simply represents
a two-to-one outnumbering of labor on such boards, as opposed to bipartism
where the government plays no direct role and labor and management are
equally represented. Establishing a bipartite structure for the WHSA was again
viewed as an important gain for labor.
But at the intermediate level in Ontario, that is, with the 12 delivery organi-
zations, labor (and management) have both resisted bipartitism. Part of this can
be attributed to the fact that the WHSA was a new entity that labor could help
to design from inception. The delivery organizations on the other hand were
significantly older than the WHSA and were initiated either by employer safety
councils or (in the case of the Workers Health and Safety Centre) by labor.
Most were set up long before the adoption of the internal responsibility system
in Ontario. While they varied greatly in their understanding of the new philoso-
phy in health and safety, a government study commissioned by the WHSA
advised that the delivery organizations could not be supplanted or replaced in
the short term without "undesirable dislocation of services" (SPR Associates,
Inc. 1991, 14). Although there have been important breakthroughs in moving
the delivery organizations toward greater collaboration and cooperation, such
as the jointly designed curricula, for the most part the organizations still see
their approaches as very different and distinct. The labor-oriented Workers
Health and Safety Centre, for example, includes chapters on "strategies for
change," "collective bargaining," and "violence in the workplace" in its train-
ing manual. All these topics are viewed as "political" by the IAPA and are not
part of the jointly authored curriculum for the province's certification program
(OFL 1992).
Most unionists recognize that the adoption of the internal responsibility sys-
tem means a significant rebalancing of worker and management roles, with
labor gaining new rights and powers on work environment issues. However,
many union health and safety specialists remain critical of the system, arguing
that worker representatives are not yet "fully empowered as partners in work-
place decision making" and have "responsibility without authority." These crit-
ics refer to the system as the eternal responsibility system. The term "eternal
responsibility" was coined to describe the frequent failure to resolve issues
because of the relative powerlessness of the committees. Greater responsibility,
argue labor representatives, must be balanced with greater authority—and
some labor activists had expected that greater authority to be the right of
worker representatives to unilaterally stop work.368 Elaine Bernard
Gary Cwitco, director of occupational health and safety with the Communi-
cations Workers of Canada, observes that there is tremendous turnover and
burnout among worker committee members. Cwitco, a critic of the internal
responsibility system, explains that with the adoption of the three rights and
the joint committees as vehicles of participation, activists misread the changes
and assumed that they would now have real joint authority in work environ-
ment matters. But in Cwitco's estimation, the purely advisory role of joint com-
mittees has meant, in effect, that management can still choose to ignore com-
mittee recommendations. Cwitco argues that "responsibility without authority
is meaningless and frustrating" (Cwitco 1992). He admits that while the power
of argument alone may be effective with an already cooperative management,
there is little that a committee can do in a situation where management chooses
to "stonewall" recommendations and gives low priority to the work of the com-
mittee. In a similar vein, union health and safety expert Bob Dematteo argues
that there is a "need for mechanisms which would provide workers with greater
influence over health and safety decisions, and the enhancement of the external
system of enforcement" (Dematteo 1991, 15).
While unions remain critical of what they view as the imbalance of power
in the internal responsibility system, they are generally supportive of the gains
that unions and workers have made with the mandating of committees and the
winning of the three rights. There is a recognition that even the relatively weak
"right to participate" provisions have provided for ongoing discussions with
management—an improvement over the old regime of exclusive management
rights with periodic collective bargaining. In one example cited by Cwitco,
after a series of studies conducted by joint committees at Bell Canada proved
that individual performance monitoring of employees caused harmful stress,
the worker representatives on the joint committee were able to persuade the
company to eliminated the practice—something the union had sought but was
unable to achieve through regular collective bargaining.
12.6 Relations with Workers
There are few quantitative studies that look at joint committees in non-
unionized work sites. Indeed, it is often asserted that in a majority of non-
unionized work sites the committees simply do not exist, though the lack of
detailed studies makes this assertion questionable. An important exception to
the lack of studies, however, is the 1986 Ontario Advisory Council's survey.
While this study shows that nonunion work sites are less likely than unionized
work sites to have a joint committee, it nevertheless found an impressive level
of compliance even in nonunionized work sites (see table 12.2).
The Ontario study's historical pattern shows that even before the legislation
mandated joint committees, many large work sites and unionized work sites
had already established committees. There was a significant increase in com-
mittee formation after 1976 with the passage of the Employee Health and369 Canada: Joint Committees on Occupational Health and Safety
Table 12.2 JHSCs in Ontario (% of workplaces with JHSCs)
Type of Workplace
2
Nonunionized with no designated
substances


























Source: Data from screening survey.
aNote that status of workplace with regard to size, unions, and presence of designated substances
is always estimated from 1985 status (Ontario Advisory Council 1986, 34).
"Workplaces of 20 or more workers, where a JHSC is required by the Occupational Health and
Safety Act.
Safety Act of 1976, which encouraged, though did not mandate, the forming
of committees. Under the voluntary regime, however, committees in non-
unionized work sites were rare. With the passage of the OHS Act in 1978 and
the mandating of committees, the smaller work sites and nonunionized firms
still tend to lag behind the large unionized firms. By 1984, compliance by
nonunionized work sites stood at 88.4 percent compared to unionized work-
sites at 96 percent (see table 12.3).
Although simply registering the existence of committees is a relatively easy
task, registration alone sheds little light on their functioning. The Ontario study
did, however, record the assessment of committee members of overall commit-
tee functioning and reported a generally favorable attitude among worker
members of JHSCs: 59.4 percent rated the record of committees in improving
safety and reducing accidents as very positive (Ontario Advisory Council
1986, 95).
In attempting to isolate factors contributing to the success of committees,
the report found that when the distribution of influence in the committee was
in favor of workers, it was seen as a moderate facilitator of JHSC success in
the estimation of both manager and worker members of committees (Ontario
Advisory Council 1986, 149). While this might appear to run counter to the
stated intent of "equal partners," it makes sense in the context of advisory com-
mittees where management alone ultimately decides whether to implement a
JHSC recommendation. Strong worker representation on these committees,
judged as "more worker influenced," increases worker input into the commit-
tee. However, only about 10 percent of committees were judged by both man-

























































Table 12.3 Historical Pattern of JHSC Establishment (% of workplaces with
JHSCs, by year of JHSC establishment)
Type of Workplace" Pre-1970 1971-76 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
All workplaces with
20+ workers 9.2 25.8 29.7 37.4 49.5 65.3 74.6 81.3 88.0 92.9
Workplaces by union status
Nonunionized 4.2 13.9 16.7
Unionized 12.7 34.0 38.7
Workplaces by presence of designated substances
Not present 7.1 22.1 25.8
Present 16.5 38.7 43.1
Workplaces by size (number of workers)
20-74 5.1 18.3 20.9
75-249 13.4 32.0 38.3
250-499 17.7 44.6 51.2
500+ 21.0 52.6 54.5
Source: Data from screening survey.
aNote that the status of workplace with regard to size, unions, and presence of designated sub-
stances is always estimated from 1985 status (Ontario 1986, 35).
percent viewed as more influenced by management (Ontario Advisory Council
1986,71).
The problem of management influence of committees exists at a number of
levels. First, there is the imbalance of resources. The right to participate does
not usually guarantee workers access to resources, including communications
with experts, time for preparation and investigation, and training in the field of
health and safety. For example, the recent Ontario OHS Act amendments and
certification program includes compulsory training for at least one worker rep-
resentative per committee and stipulates that work representatives are to be
given at least one hour paid "preparation time" before committee meetings.
Despite this fact, there is still an imbalance of resources between management
and workers on the committees.
At a second level, employer influence can be felt over the selection of worker
representatives. The 1986 Ontario study found, for example, that in about one-
third (35 percent) of the committees worker members of JHSCs were selected
by management either through direct appointment by management or by man-
agement overseeing the selection of volunteers. This study found that worker
committee representatives were selected by the following means (percentages
given in parentheses): appointed by management (19), management accep-
tance of volunteers (16.2), appointed by union executives (18.1), appointed by
employee association executive (2.3), chosen by workers at election (31.7),
accepted by workers at a meeting where volunteers come forward (12.7) (On-
tario Advisory Council 1986, 47). The recent Ontario legislation included a
number of measures to assure worker representatives independence from man-371 Canada: Joint Committees on Occupational Health and Safety
agement influence. However, it did not require a secret ballot election or gen-
eral meeting of all affected employees.
A final level of management influence is sometimes referred to as "company
capture" of the committee, with management ignoring worker representatives'
concerns and simply using the committee as a forum to justify its practices and
explain why workers' fears are unfounded. This is the most difficult phenome-
non to measure. Bryce and Manga, for example, noted in their study of com-
mittees in Saskatchewan that worker committee members come to "under-
stand" the financial constraints of the enterprise. Robert Sass, on the other
hand, contends that this often-cited "maturing" of a committee, one marked by
fewer "disputes" and "concerns," might in fact simply be a result of company
capture (Sass 1992). Generally, the problem of company capture has tended
to focus on committees in nonunionized work sites, where workers have few
resources and where there are fewer assurances of independent selection of
worker representatives.
A weakness observed in both the 1986 study and the current legislation is
the link between the worker representatives and the workers they represent.
While the curriculum for the new certificate program in Ontario emphasizes
the importance of worker representatives seeking input from workers and the
need for representatives to report back to the workers, this link is still tenu-
ous—with no formal reporting procedures required. The 1986 study found that
of JHSCs in nonunionized work sites, 46.5 percent reported to worker meet-
ings at least quarterly (compared to 61 percent in unionized work sites), and
37.9 percent of JHSCs in nonunionized work sites never reported to worker
meetings at all (compared with 17.5 percent in unionized work sites) (Ontario
Advisory Council 1986, 84).
Through Ontario's province wide certification program worker representa-
tives will have guaranteed access to some training, and it is expected that they
will seek to build an ongoing relationship with the delivery organization that
provided their training. A major question for the near future will be who will
train and service the worker representatives on committees in nonunionized
settings. With 12 delivery organizations to chose from, ranging from the labor-
oriented Workers Health and Safety Centre to the management-oriented sec-
toral safety organizations, and no requirement that management and worker
representatives take training from the same organization, it remains to be seen
how the worker representatives in nonunionized settings will respond to this
opportunity.
12.7 Nurturing Joint Committees
The Canadian experience in mandating joint occupational health and safety
committees is still relatively new, with less than 15 years practice in most juris-
dictions. It marks an important departure from traditional North American in-372 Elaine Bernard
dustrial relations, which sees worker self-organization into unions and collec-
tive bargaining as the primary (if not sole) vehicle for worker participation in
workplace decision making. The experience with the JHSCs shows that the
seemingly opposing systems of adversarial collective bargaining and coopera-
tion are able to coexist.
An important factor in making coexistence possible is that neither organized
labor nor management views the mandated joint committees as either a substi-
tution for or facilitator of unionism. From the management perspective, experi-
ence has demonstrated that these committees do not become incipient organiz-
ing committees prompting employees to unionize. At the same time, they
provide management with independent worker participation and voice in deci-
sion making. From the union side, the legislation does not attempt to circum-
vent unions and by generally extending worker rights has augmented union
influence in organized work sites. Unions, for the most part, do not fear the
committees will become substitutes for unions because they believe that
the full exercise of workers' rights and empowerment requires both self-
organization (and independence from management influence) and resources
that only the labor movement can deliver to employee representatives.
For nonunionized employees empowered with the new rights and joint com-
mittees, the experience has been at best uneven. Compared to the old regime
of health and safety as an exclusive management right and responsibility, the
new system constitutes an important breakthrough for workers. But, with little
active monitoring of the regulation and few resources available to the non-
unionized workers, substantial numbers of employees have not been able to
fully exercise these rights.
Ontario's recent attempts to establish self-regulation through an internal re-
sponsibility system have demonstrated the crucial role that government must
play in facilitating and promoting this system. Working with both the existing
delivery organizations (and most especially the employer-based sectoral safety
committees which constitute rare multiemployer forums in sectors where em-
ployers are otherwise highly decentralized) and creating a new entity, the bipar-
tite WHSA, the provincial government has moved the joint system beyond the
level of committees in the workplace to provincewide structures. By continu-
ing to work with the existing delivery organizations, the government enlisted
these organizations into accepting bipartitism on behalf of the two most power-
ful parties, the employers and the unions. Transforming the role of government,
the move to self-regulation has meant increased rights for workers, new gov-
ernment regulation that seeks to promote and finance training, and the creation
of a new bipartite body to administer and promote the new approach.
It remains to be seen whether the mandated joint committee experience will
extend beyond occupational health and safety. Possible areas for mandated
joint committees are technological change, training, and restructuring. To date,
however, no jurisdiction in Canada has taken the initiative in mandating joint
committee participation for the workforce in general on other issues. Neither373 Canada: Joint Committees on Occupational Health and Safety
labor nor management seem particularly inclined to promote the extension of
bipartitism into other fields. On the other hand, government, under increasing
financial pressures and out of a desire to limit regulation, might find the inter-
nal regulation system an attractive alternative to direct intervention. Finally, if
there is pressure to introduce new forms of employee representation, the man-
dated JHSCs could provide an instructive prototype.
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